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To investigate why young workers exhibit higher unemployment and separation rates,
I extend the basic matching model of Pissarides by incorporating learning on match qual-
ity as Pries and Rogerson (2005). Match quality is heterogenous and is inferred from the
output performance. Because matches revealed to be bad are dissolved, the separation risk
decreases with job tenure. Within the framework, the speciﬁcity of youth only comes from
their entry position on the labor market. Discrepancies between age-groups arise as young
workers are mainly unemployed searching for their ﬁrst job, or newly employed facing higher
unemployment risks. The model, calibrated above French data, performs well in reproducing
the intergenerational gap in worker separation and unemployment rates.
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11 Introduction
Whatever the OECD country considered, younger workers display both higher unemployment
rates (ﬁgure 4, appendix A) and higher turnover (ﬁgure 5, appendix A): they experience several
short-lived jobs before settling into more stable employment2. Although the canonical matching
model has proved its strength to analyze labor market ﬂows, it fails to account for the high
levels of youth unemployment and worker separation rates. This paper asserts that introducing
learning on match quality into the standard matching model helps to explain the speciﬁcity of
youth labor markets observed in most OECD countries.
The matching theory points out that search frictions render time-consuming the access to
employment (Mortensen (1982), Pissarides (1984, 1985)). With heterogeneities and costly ac-
quisition of information, ﬁrms and workers have to spend time and resources to ﬁnd productive
matches. As many young workers start as unemployed searching their ﬁrst job, the unemploy-
ment rate of a particular cohort of workers decreases from its initial level at the labor market
entry to its stationary level. It results in higher youth unemployment rates. Nevertheless, for
realistic values of the job ﬁnding and job destruction rates, the cohort-speciﬁc unemployment
rate declines quite rapidly to its stationary level and the basic matching model is not able to
reproduce the high levels of youth unemployment. The main reason is that job creations are
suﬃciently high to generate a fast transition into employment. Once calibrated above French
data, I show that the basic model only accounts for half of the unemployment gap that is ob-
served between young workers and workers over 25 years old. Moreover, it fails to reproduce any
discrepancy in worker turnover.
To better account for the youth labor market performance, I propose a framework in which
the matching process between ﬁrms and workers is costly and leads to match of diﬀerent quality.
Moreover, discovering the quality of a match is time-consuming so that ﬁrms and workers are
not able to weed out all bad matches before engaging in production. Because matches that
are inferred to be bad are terminated, new workers initially face a higher job loss risk. Intro-
ducing learning on match quality yields a model with recurring job loss in which the tenure
proﬁle of separation rates is decreasing. It is consistent with the empirical evidence from worker
turnover data3 (see ﬁgures 5 and 6). Accounting for this feature, that is not captured by the
2See for instance Quintini et al. (2007)
3The observed decrease of transition rates from employment to unemployment with job tenure is partly due
2basic model, helps to reconcile the high level of youth unemployment with the evidence on job
ﬁnding rates: new workers ﬁnd a job quite quickly but need time to settle into stable employ-
ment. The cohort-speciﬁc unemployment rate thus declines more gradually to its stationary level.
The framework I develop borrows from Pries and Rogerson (2005) who combine the Pissarides
(1985) matching model and the Jovanovic (979b) learning model. While Jovanovic (979b) as-
sumes that match quality is gradually revealed over time by the sequence of output performances,
Pries and Rogerson (2005) incorporate a stochastic learning process. There are two types of em-
ployment relationships in the economy: good and bad matches. Once engaged in production,
ﬁrms and workers observe the output performance which is the sum of two unobserved com-
ponents: the match quality that is constant over time, and a noisy component. This second
component represents transitory factors that aﬀect the match independently of its quality. Pries
and Rogerson (2005) assume a serially uncorrelated variable with zero-mean and uniformly dis-
tributed. It implies that the bayesian revelation mechanism about match quality takes a "all
or nothing" form: after each period, either uncertainty remains as before or the match quality
is fully revealed. The learning probability of the match quality, thereby the separation rate, is
determined by the distribution of the noisy component. In the developed framework, workers are
ex-ante homogenous but face diﬀerent job loss risks depending on their tenure. The speciﬁcity
of young workers only comes from their entry position on the labor market: they are either un-
employed or newly employed facing higher unemployment risks. The model thus contributes to
explain the high levels of unemployment and separation rates observed among young workers.
To investigate the quantitative contribution of learning on match quality to youth labor mar-
ket outcomes, I calibrate the model above French data. I target the job ﬁnding rate of the
economy and compute the learning process to reproduce an empirically plausible proﬁle of the
worker separation rate with job tenure. I show that, under this learning process, the cohort-
speciﬁc unemployment rate ﬁrst increases at the labor market entry as new workers experience
short-lived jobs. It starts to decrease once workers enter stable employment and converges grad-
ually to its asymptotic level. Next, I consider the labor market outcomes of two age-groups,
the 20-24 and the 25-49 years old individuals. I ﬁnd that learning on match quality generates
to the use of ﬁx-term contracts. Nevertheless, ﬁgure 6 (appendix A) suggests that in France, the tenure proﬁle
of separation rates is decreasing whatever the type of contracts. Moreover, workers of any age-group display
quite similar proﬁles (ﬁgure 5, appendix A). Most of the decrease occurs in the ﬁrst two years of the employment
relationship.
384% of the diﬀerences observed between age-groups in separation rates and high level of youth
unemployment. It explains 80% of the youth-adult unemployment gap simulated by the model
while the remaining 20% arise from search frictions.
With regard to the theoretical literature, there are diﬀerent explanations to the decreas-
ing tenure proﬁle of job loss risks, as learning-by-doing (Jovanovic (979a)) or learning about
match quality (Jovanovic (979b)). However, from a French matched employer-employee data
set, Nagypál (2007) found that learning about match quality is the main determinant of recur-
ring job loss. Besides, Pries (2004) showed that accounting for the uncertainty about match
quality that remains following match creation helps to explain the unemployment rate persis-
tence.
A bulk of the empirical and theoretical literature examining youth labor markets emphasizes
the role played by other important factors as human capital accumulation, labor market institu-
tions or workers’ search behavior. For instance, Kitao et al. (2008) proposed a model in which
young workers entering the labor market pass trough a phase of job churning before being able
to accumulate human capital. It results in high youth unemployment rates, that has risen more
in Europe than in the United States due to increases in minimum wages. Finally, most closely
related to this work is Neal (1999) who investigated the mobility patterns of young workers
searching for a suitable career. Data on labor market ﬂows suggest that young workers do not
only exhibit higher but also more complex turnover4. Neal (1999) argued that changing ﬁrst
both employers and careers is and optimal job search strategy.
The next section presents the theoretical framework while the quantitative analysis is pro-
vided in Section 3.
4"Simple job shifts occur when workers change employers but continue doing the same type of work. Complex
shifts occur when workers not only change employers but also change tasks", Neal (1999).
42 The Model
The model builds on the standard matching framework5, in which searching for a job or a worker
are costly and time-consuming activities, but diﬀers from it with respect to job destruction.
Following Pries and Rogerson (2005), I incorporate learning on match quality to yield a model
with recurring job loss.
2.1 The environment
Time is discrete. All agents are forward-looking, risk-neutral and have a common discount factor
β. The analysis is conducted in steady state.
The labor market is populated by a unit mass of homogenous workers who are either em-
ployed or unemployed. I assume that in each period, a fraction δ of workers called young enters
the labor force. Labor force inﬂows represent new entrants coming from education. To account
for school-to-work transitions, I assume that not all entries ﬂow into unemployment: a fraction
ζ of new workers starts directly as employed in their ﬁrst job. All workers may leave the labor
market at rate δ so that the labor force is constant. Workers face an endogenous measure of
identical ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm has one job that can be either vacant or ﬁlled.
The process that brings ﬁrms and workers together is captured by the matching func-
tion m(u,v), where u and v are respectively the unemployment rate and the vacancy rate of
the economy. Let θ  v
u denote the labor market tightness. The probability of an unem-
ployed ﬁnding a job is p(θ) 
m(u;v)
u = m(1,θ). The probability of a ﬁrm ﬁnding a worker is
q(θ) 
m(u;v)
v = m(1/θ,1). As workers exit the labor force with rate δ, the number of matches
formed in each period equals (1 δ)m(u,v). Then, (1 δ)p(θ) and (1 δ)q(θ) are respectively the
probability of a worker entering employment and the probability of a ﬁrm ﬁlling a vacancy. The
matching function is strictly increasing with respect to each of its arguments and exhibits con-
stant returns to scale6. In consequence, for 0 < θ < 1, q′(θ) < 0 and p′(θ) > 0. The limits of the
probabilities are : lim→∞ p(θ) = 1 ; lim→∞ q(θ) = 0 and lim→0 p(θ) = 0 ; lim→0 q(θ) = 1.
Congestion externalities arise in the labor market because of search frictions. Unemployed work-
5See Pissarides (2000) for the derivation of the model with exogenous or endogenous job destruction.
6See Blanchard and Diamond (1991) and Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). The latter summarizes the wealth
of support for a Cobb-Douglas matching function with constant returns to scale.
5ers ﬁnd a job more easily when there are less job seekers relative to the vacancies.
A unit of production is a matched worker-ﬁrm pair. At the end of period t, ﬁrms and
workers observe the output ﬂow ~ yt = y + µt, which is the sum of two unobserved components:
y is the match quality and µt is a noisy component. Although workers are ex-ante identical,
there are two types of matches in the economy. Good matches produce yg and bad matches
produce yb < yg. The match quality is persistent: a good match remains good as long as it
remains intact, and a bad match is not productive enough to be formed. If all uncertainty was
resolved during the job search process, only good matches would be formed. Instead, I introduce
information imperfections that prevent ﬁrms and workers from observing the match quality
before engaging in production. In consequence, some bad matches are formed and dissolved once
their quality is revealed. Job creation decisions depend on on the proportion of good matches
in the economy, ψ, which is common knowledge. ψ represents the probability of forming a good
match7. Once formed the match, the ﬁrm and the worker attempt to infer its true quality
from the observed output ﬂow. The observation of y is contaminated by transitory factors, µt,
that aﬀect the match independently of its quality. The learning process is thus time-consuming.
While Jovanovic (1979b) assumes that match quality is gradually revealed, Pries and Rogerson
(2005) incorporate stochastic accumulation of information: µ is a mean zero iid random variable,
uniformly distributed on [  µ,  µ]. The observed output ﬂow of a i-type match ~ yi;t is thus drawn
from a uniform distribution over [yi   µ;yi+  µ] for i = fb,gg. It implies that the learning process
takes a "all-or-nothing" form, (see ﬁgure 1):
 If ~ yt > yb +  µ, the match is revealed to be good, while if ~ yt < yg    µ the match is revealed
to be bad.
 If ~ yt 2 [yg    µ,yb+  µ], ﬁrms and workers cannot determine whether the observation reﬂects
more the fundamental quality of the match rather than a temporary spell of bad or good
fortune. They attempt to infer the information next period according to the new realization
of ~ y.
7Here I diﬀer from Pries and Rogerson (2005) who assume that the value of   is drawn from a general
distribution at the time of meeting. Firms and workers evaluate the potential of their match before engaging in
production. Not all matches turn out to be potentially good enough to be formed. This assumption is required
to analyze how labor market institutions or policies aﬀect hiring practices by inducing ﬁrms to be more or less
selective. As I do not investigate hiring practices, I assume homogeneity in potential match quality.
6Figure 1: The learning process
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Under this learning process, the probability to infer match quality each period equals:
p(~ yt > yb +  µ) + p(~ yt < yg    µ)
=1   p(µt  yb   y +  µ) + p(µt < yg   y    µ)




The probability to infer good and bad match quality is respectively αψ and α(1   ψ). If the
observation is such that bad quality is revealed, the ﬁrm and the worker agree to separate and
search for a new match. I consider only equilibria in which matches revealed to be bad are
dissolved8. Besides, all jobs are assumed to be hit by an idiosyncratic shock that renders them
unproductive with probability s. In this economy, worker turnover results from the reallocation
process between ﬁrms and workers searching for a good match rather than from the output’s
ﬂuctuations (as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)). All new matches are formed while the
quality is unknown and are thus subject to high separation rates. Once the quality of the match
is revealed, surviving matches become more stable and face a lower dissolution rate. This gener-
ates empirically plausible proﬁles of worker separation rates by job tenure (see ﬁgure 2, section 2).
The timing of events is the following: job search occurring in t entails production in t + 1.
At the end of the period, ﬁrms and workers observe the output ﬂow ~ yt+1 and either reveal the
8The calibration of yg is such that bad matches are not productive enough to be formed or retained (see section
2).
7true match quality or not. Some matches turn out to be dissolved; whatever the cause of the
separation, ﬁrms and workers are allowed to search for a new suitable match next period9.
2.2 The Equilibrium
Let v, n and g be the values to a ﬁrm of respectively, an unﬁlled employment position, a
match of unknown quality and a match that has been revealed to be good. v satisﬁes:
v =  c + β
{
(1   δ)q(θ)n + [1   (1   δ)q(θ)]v
}
(1)
Posting a vacancy implies a per period ﬁxed cost c. With probability (1 δ)q(θ), the ﬁrm meets
a worker who remains on the labor market and the position is ﬁlled. In equilibrium, all proﬁt
opportunities are exploited so that the rent from vacant jobs is drove to zero (v = 0). In steady
state, the values of a match, n and g, satisfy:
n = ψyg + (1   ψ)yb   wn + β(1   δ)(1   s)
{
αψg + (1   α)n
}
(2)
g = yg   wg + β(1   δ)(1   s)g (3)
These values equal current period proﬁts, that is the expected output minus the wage (wj for
j = fn,gg), plus the job continuation value. The expected output ﬂow of matches with unknown
quality is a weighted average of good and bad qualities as E(~ yt) = E(y)+E(µt) = ψyg+(1 ψ)yb.
The expected output of matches known to be good equals yg. With the exogenous probability
δ + (1   δ)s, the job becomes vacant following either the worker’s exit from the labor market or
a shock. Symmetrically, the worker remains on the labor market and the match remains produc-
tive with probability (1   δ)(1   s). If the quality is unknown (consider the value n), the ﬁrm
and the worker decide whether or not to separate according to the output performance. With
probability αψ, the observed output ﬂow is suﬃciently high to infer good quality and the ﬁrm
continues with the value g. With probability α(1   ψ), the observed output ﬂow is suﬃciently
low to infer bad quality. Matches revealed to be bad are terminated so that the ﬁrm starts
searching for a new match. With probability (1   α) the match quality remains unknown. The
ﬁrm and the worker then continue producing independently of the past realizations of ~ y10.
9Contrary to Pries and Rogerson (2005), I do not assume that a job ceases to exist when hit by a shock. This
assumption is required by the authors to distinguish worker turnover from job turnover.
10The quality remains unknown if the observed output ﬂow is between yg     and yb +  . According to the
calibration of  , some realizations of the output ﬂow could be lower than or equal to bad quality: yg      ~ y  yb
8Let V u, Vn and Vg be the values to a worker of respectively unemployment, being in a match of
unknown quality and being in a match that is known to be good. We have:
V u = z + β(1   δ)
{
p(θ)Vn + [1   p(θ)]V u
}
(4)
Vn = wn + β(1   δ)
[
s + (1   s)α(1   ψ)
]
V u + β(1   δ)(1   s)
{
αψVg + (1   α)Vn
}
(5)
Vg = wg + β(1   δ)sV u + β(1   δ)(1   s)Vg (6)
Job seekers enjoy some real return z that integrates home production. With probability δ, the
worker exits the labor market and gets zero. Workers employed in a match of unknown quality
ﬂow into unemployment with probability (1   δ)[s + (1   s)α(1   ψ)], which is higher than the
transition probability from good matches to unemployment, (1   δ)s. In the developed frame-
work, access to stable employment is time-consuming due to learning on match quality.
The expected joint surplus of a match equals Sj = Vj  V u +j for j = fn,gg. Substituting the
value functions into this expression gives:
Sn = ψyg + (1   ψ)yb + β(1   δ)(1   s)
[
αψSg + (1   α)Sn
]
  [1   β(1   δ)]V u (7)
Sg = yg + β(1   δ)(1   s)Sg   [1   β(1   δ)]V u (8)
A match that is known to be good yields a higher surplus than a match with unknown quality
(Sg > Sn). At the time of meeting, the ﬁrm and the worker bargain over wages to share Sn.
The initial negotiation is thus based on the expected output ﬂow ψyg + (1   ψ)yb. Once the
match is revealed to be good, the wage is renegotiated according to the true quality yg. As is
standard, I use the Nash bargaining solution in which the worker’s threat point is the value of
being unemployed and the employer’s threat point is the value of a vacancy. Let γ denote the
worker’s bargaining power. The sharing rule is given by:
j = (1   γ)Sj (9)
(see ﬁgure 1). However, separation would not be optimal if this is due to a temporary spell of bad fortune rather
than to bad quality. The expected gains in the future would recover the present loss. As  has mean zero and is
independently distributed, the ﬁrm and the worker continue producing as long as the bad quality has not been
revealed.
9The free entry condition and the sharing rule imply:
c
(1   δ)q(θ)
= β(1   γ)Sn (10)
The labor market tightness is such that the expected cost of hiring a worker equals the expected
share of surplus that the ﬁrm gets from a new match.
From equations (4) and (10), one can show that:




Substituting this expression into (7) and (8) yields:
Sn = ψyg + (1   ψ)yb + β(1   δ)(1   s)
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The expected joint surplus of a match is linear and decreasing in θ. Equation (10) thus has a
unique solution for θ as the right hand side is increasing in θ while the left hand side is decreasing
in θ. Because of congestion externalities, an improve in the labor market tightness reduces the
probability to a ﬁrm of ﬁlling a vacancy and increases the probability to a worker of ﬁnding a
job. The cost of hiring a worker thus raises and the match surplus is reduced as the workers’
outside option increases.
Using the bargaining rule, one can recover the wage functions:
wn = γ
{
ψyg + (1   ψ)yb + cθ
}
+ (1   γ)z (14)
wg = γfyg + cθg + (1   γ)z (15)
For ψ < 1, we have wn < wg. As long as the match quality remains unknown, workers initially
face both a higher unemployment risk and a lower wage.
10At the steady state, the mass of unemployed workers (denoted u) and of workers employed in
unknown matches (denoted en) are determined by the ﬂow equilibrium conditions:
δ(1   ζ)
      
Entry as unemployed
+ (1   δ)
{
s(1   u) + (1   s)α(1   ψ)en
}
      
Separations: shocks and revelation of bad quality
= δu     
Exit from the labor force
+ (1   δ)p(θ)u
      
Match formation
(16)
δζ     
Entry as employed
+ (1   δ)p(θ)u
      
Match formation
= δen     
Exit from the labor force
+(1   δ)sen       
Shocks
+ (1   δ)(1   s)αen       
Revelation of match quality
(17)
The mass of workers employed in matches known to be good equals 1   u   en  eg.
Deﬁnition 1. A steady-state equilibrium is a list θ, u and en that satisﬁes:
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2. The ﬂow equations (14) and (15).






  β(1   γ)Sn(θ)
}
< 0
11which is satisﬁed under the following condition:
c <
β(1   δ)(1   γ)
[
1   β(1   δ)(1   s)(1   α)
]
{
ψyg + (1   ψ)yb   z +
β(1   δ)(1   s)αψ
[
1   β(1   δ)(1   s)
](yg   z)
}
If the cost of a vacancy is low enough (lower than the expected discounted future output net of
home production), there exists a labor market equilibrium in which ﬁrms post vacancies while the
fundamental quality of a match is inferred only by engaging in production.
2.3 The dynamics of cohort-speciﬁc unemployment
This paper asserts that learning on match quality helps to explain the high level of youth un-
employment in a matching framework. To understand this point, I propose to analyze the
unemployment dynamics with or without learning on match quality for a particular cohort of
workers. At each period, a new cohort of size δ enters the labor market while a fraction δ of
each cohort exits the labor market. Cohorts are indexed by the age A of their members. Let
uA and eA denote the mass of respectively, unemployed and employed workers from the cohort
of age A. Normalizing the cohort-speciﬁc labor force to unity yields uA + eA = 1. The initial
condition prevailing at the labor market entry implies u0 = (1   ζ), with ζ the fraction of new
workers beginning as employed in their ﬁrst job. As a starting point, consider that unemployed
workers ﬁnd a job with probability p. The model with learning on match quality diﬀers from the
standard matching model with respect to job destruction.
The standard matching model emphasizes the accumulation of information that occurs dur-
ing the search process. Access to employment is time-consuming (p < 1) but uncertainty about
match quality is resolved at the time of meeting so that matches of poor quality are not formed.
All workers face a constant separation probability s. The dynamics of the cohort-speciﬁc unem-
ployment rate is the following:
uA+1 = (1   δ)(1   p)uA + (1   δ)s(1   uA) (19)
For ζ = 0, all young workers start as unemployed and the cohort-speciﬁc unemployment rate
unambiguously decreases towards its stationary level11. Consequently, young workers, deﬁned
as new entrants on the labor market, display higher unemployment rates. Nevertheless, a fast
11The stationary level of the cohort-speciﬁc unemployment rate is reached at age  A for which u  A+1 = u  A. In
12transition into employment (high level of p) accelerates the pace at which the cohort-speciﬁc
unemployment rate declines to its stationary level, thus reducing the unemployment gap be-
tween young and older workers. For values of p and s characterizing the French economy, the
standard matching model is not able to reproduce the high level of youth unemployment (see
the quantitative analysis, section 2.2).
The model developed in this paper considers that uncertainty about match quality remains
following match formation. Workers are now either unemployed, employed in a match with
unknown quality or employed in a match that has been revealed to be good (eA = en;A + eg;A).
The initial conditions prevailing at the labor market entry imply u0 = (1 ζ) and en;0 = ζ. The
unemployment rate of a particular cohort reaches its stationary level according to the following
dynamics:
uA+1 = (1   δ)(1   p)uA + (1   δ)s(1   uA) + (1   δ)(1   s)α(1   ψ)en;A (20)
with en;A+1 = (1   δ)puA + (1   δ)(1   s)(1   α)en;A (21)
The addition of a third state in which workers are employed in unknown matches makes the
cohort-speciﬁc unemployment rate converges more slowly to its stationary level12. New entrants
experience short-lived jobs and multiple spells of unemployment before settling into a good
match. Consequently, the youth-adult unemployment gap increases with respect to the standard
matching model. The youth labor market outcomes generated by the framework depend on the
transition rates between the diﬀerent states of the labor market, as the school-to-work transition,
the job ﬁnding rate and the learning process. For instance, the higher school-to-work transitions,
the lower the youth unemployment rate. This is consistent with OECD data: It is well known that
education systems by apprenticeship results in smoother school-to-work transitions, as observed
in Germany and Denmark (contrary to France or Belgium).
the basic matching model, it equals:
u  A =
(1   )s [
(1   )(1   p   s)
]
12In the model with learning on match quality, the stationary level of the unemployment rate of a particular
cohort equals:
u  A =
[




1   (1   )(1   s)(1   )
][
(1   )(1   p   s)
]
  (1   )2(1   s)(1    )p
133 Youth labor market outcomes
To investigate the youth labor market outcomes generated by the framework, I introduce two
stochastic age-groups. New workers enter the labor force as young and face a probability λ of
remaining young next period. Conversely, (1   λ) is the probability of entering the adult age-
group. Recall that all workers exit the labor force with probability δ13. Within the framework,
the speciﬁcity of youth only comes from their entry position on the labor market. Discrepancies
between age-groups arise with search frictions and learning on match quality. Basically, as young
workers need time to ﬁnd both a job and a good stable match, they exhibit higher separation and
unemployment rates. In order to take into account typical age-speciﬁc unemployment rates, I
consider a youth population composed by 20-24 years old individuals starting working, and adult
workers who are between 25 and 49 years old14. I derive some employment statistics from the
French Labor Force Survey of 2002. The model is computed by requiring that the equilibrium
matches salient features of the worker turnover data for the whole population (20-49 years old
individuals). I then quantitatively analyze the role played by learning on match quality on the
youth labor market outcomes. The labor market ﬂows by age-group are detailed in Appendix B.
3.1 Calibration
The month is taken as unit of time. The probability λ is ﬁxed to 0.98 so that the average duration
of youth is 5 years15. The proportion of 20-24 years old individuals among the considered labor
force was observed to be 16.23% in France in 2002. In the developed framework, it is given by
ly = 
1−(1−) (Appendix B). The value of δ is ﬁxed to 0.32% in order to reproduce16 ly = 0.1623.
The fraction of new workers entering as employed, ζ, is set according to the monthly transition
rate from school to employment.
The value of home production is normalized to 1. In order to rule out equilibria in which
matches revealed to be bad are preserved, I set17 yb = z.
13Assuming that only adult workers can exit the labor force as they retire would introduce age-speciﬁcity.
Chéron A. et al. (2008) pointed out that the distance to retirement implies age-diﬀerentiated labor market ﬂows.
This paper does not consider the age-related horizon eﬀect.
14Chéron A. et al. (2008) pointed out that the labor market outcomes of older workers strongly depend on the
distance to retirement. As I assumed that all workers exit the labor force at the same rate, workers over 50 years
old are excluded from the analysis.
15The probability  could be computed to analyze the discrepancies between [20-29] and [30-49] years old
individuals. The corresponding results are provided as a robustness test in Appendix C.2.
16As the labor force is constant,  is both the labor market entry and exit rate. Its value could be calibrated
either according to the proportion of new entrants among the labor force or according to the proportion of workers
exiting the labor force. It gave similar results, provided in Appendix C.1.
17yb = z is a suﬃcient condition to ensure that b < 
v since one would obtain b = (1   )(yb   z)   c +
14In the developed framework, recurring job loss arises as learning on match quality generates
higher unemployment risks at the beginning of the employment relationship. The values of s,
α and ψ are thus computed by requiring that the equilibrium matches salient features of the
tenure proﬁle of the worker separation rate (it refers to the transition rate from employment
to employment). French data reveals that most of the decrease in the overall separation rate
occurs in the ﬁrst two years of employment18 (see ﬁgures 5 and 6, Appendix A). In the developed
framework the worker separation rate at higher tenure tends to s. Its value is thus ﬁxed to the
average monthly worker separation rate from jobs with tenure higher than 2 years. I choose a
value of ψ that reproduces a targeted overall separation rate of 0.94% (annual rate of 11.9%). The
probability of match quality revelation, α, is computed to match the average worker separation




. The targeting of these
three moments allows the model to reproduce quite well the tenure proﬁle of worker separation
rates (see ﬁgure 2). The calibrated value of α turns out to be 0.1282 which implies an average
learning process of 7.8 months. It is close to the ﬁndings of Pries (2004): he estimated a value
of 0.13 for the United States.
The targeted hiring rate is 9.82%. The value of c is computed to ensure that the desired
tightness is an equilibrium value. Finally, the value of good quality yg remains to be calibrated.
It turns out that this value has no eﬀect on the ﬁndings as I do not investigate the impact of
public policies. I arbitrarily set yg = 1.25 so that, given the probability α, the lowest value of
the observed output ﬂow is positive19(yb    µ > 0, see ﬁgure 1). The calibration is summarized
in Table 1 and a sensitivity analysis is provided Appendix C.
(1   )(1   s)b from equations similar to (3) and (15).
18The observed decrease in the overall separation rate can be partly due to the use of ﬁxed-term contracts and
to separations that occur during trial periods of regular contracts. In France, the maximum duration of trial
periods is ﬁxed to 4 months for low-skilled workers and to 8 months for high-skilled workers. Temporary jobs
and trial periods can be used as a screening device to sort bad matches. See for instance Nagypal E. (2002) and
Faccini R. (2008).
19The deﬁnition of the learning probability  implies y
g = y
b+2 . In order to ensure that the lowest observed
output ﬂow has positive value (  < y
b), the calibrated value of good quality has to verify y













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































16Figure 2: Separation rates by job tenure - French data LFS 2002 and simulations































French Data, LFS 2002
3.2 Quantitative analysis
The ﬁrst column of Table 2 summarizes the main labor market statistics observed in France in
2002. The youth unemployment rate is 2.5 times higher than the rate for workers over 25 years
old. A young unemployed worker in one month has a probability of being employed in the next
month that is 1.43 times higher than for adult workers. However, he has an average risk of being
separated from his job (taking all types of contracts together) that is 3.77 times higher.
I ﬁrst propose to analyze the discrepancies generated by the standard matching model. Search
frictions are the only source of imperfections: uncertainty about match quality is resolved during
the search process so that matches of poor quality are not formed. I set ψ = 1. Given the
previous value of yg, the cost of a vacancy, c, and the destruction rate, s, are computed to re-
produce the hiring and separation rates of the French economy (respectively 9.82% and 0.94%).
The simulation results, provided in the last column of Table 2, suggest that the basic matching
model generates only half of the unemployment gap observed in France between young and adult
workers. Given the values of the job ﬁnding and job destruction rates, the unemployment rate
of a particular cohort of workers declines quite rapidly from its initial level at the labor market
entry toward its stationary level (see ﬁgure 3). The stationary level is reached about 6 years
after the labor market entry.
In the developed framework, learning on match quality slows down the pace at which the
unemployment rate of a particular cohort of workers decreases to its stationary level. According
to ﬁgure 3, the cohort-speciﬁc unemployment rate ﬁrst increases due to recurring job loss: new
17workers try out jobs and quit matches that are revealed to be bad. From the eighth month
on the labor market, the unemployment rate starts to decline toward its stationary level as the
cohort of workers ﬁnally enter stable employment. While both models are computed to yield
identical unemployment rates for the whole population (approximatively 9.3%), in the model
with learning on match quality, the cohort-speciﬁc unemployment rate declines more gradually
to its stationary level, which is lower than in the basic model. Therefore, the intergenerational
unemployment gap is higher. Conditional on job tenure, workers of any-age group will have the
same trajectory of employment. However, young workers enter the labor force as unemployed or
employed in a match with unknown quality, thus facing higher unemployment risks. Simulation
results of the model with learning on match quality are reported in the second column of Table
2. The model performs well in reproducing discrepancies between age-groups in unemployment
and separation rates20. Learning on match quality generates almost 84% of the discrepancies in
separation ﬂows observed between young and adult workers. As the model does not account for
the discrepancies in the job ﬁnding rate, the unemployment gap between youth and adults turns
out to be 1.12 times higher than the observed one.
Finally, in order to investigate quantitatively the contribution of learning on match quality to
the youth-adult unemployment gap generated by the framework, I proceed with the simulation
for ζ = 1. Young workers begin as employed but may have to experience several short-lived jobs
before ﬁnding a productive match. In consequence, the discrepancies in the unemployment rate
are due to the uncertainty that remains following match creation. According to the simulation
results, that are provided in the third column of Table 2, learning on match quality accounts
for 82% of the simulated unemployment gap: the ratio between youth and adult unemployment
reaches 2.3 while the model with ζ < 1 reproduces a ratio of 2.79. The quantitative analysis
suggests that discrepancies in unemployment are mainly due to learning on match quality rather
than to search frictions.
20Computing and simulating the model to match worker turnover observed in France in 1994 gave similar










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































19Figure 3: The dynamics of cohort-speciﬁc unemployment






























Dynamics: Matching model à la Pissarides
Stationary level: Matching model à la Pissarides
Dynamics: Model with learning on match quality
Stationary level: Model with learning on match quality
4 Conclusion
Although the canonical matching model has proved its strength to explain important features of
labor markets, it fails to account for the speciﬁcity of youth labor markets observed in OECD
countries. By introducing learning on match quality in the standard matching model, the paper
provides a more complete understanding of youth labor market outcomes. As access to both
employment and stable employment is time-consuming, it seems natural that young workers
face diﬃculties when entering the labor market market. The quantitative analysis suggests that
learning on match quality generates huge discrepancies in separation and unemployment rates
between age-groups, in spite of any age-speciﬁcities. From this perspective, improving the re-
allocation process between ﬁrms and workers searching for a good match should facilitate the
labor market integration of young workers. Pries and Rogerson (2005) suggested that the labor
market institutions as dismissal costs, minimum wages and unemployment beneﬁts, prevent the
screening process of match quality. There is also much to learn about the role played by educa-
tional systems. Higher education levels can reduce mismatch while education by apprenticeship
can be used to improve the learning process on match quality.
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Figure 4: Unemployment rates by age-group - OECD 2005
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Source: Author’s calculations from the French LFS 2002. The population is composed by men aged
between 20 and 49 years old.
















Source: Author’s calculations from the French LFS 2002. The population is composed by men aged
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24B Labor market ﬂows by age-groups
The proportions of young and adult workers in the economy are denoted by respectively ly and
la. The evolution of these two populations satisﬁes:
l
y




t+1 = (1   λ)l
y
t + (1   δ)la
t
The mass of young workers at period t + 1 is composed by new entrants and by workers who
remain young and who do not exit the labor force at period t. The mass of adult workers at
period t+1 is composed by ageing young workers and by adult workers who remain on the labor
market.
At steady state, the proportion of young workers is given by:
ly =
δ
1   λ(1   δ)
(22)
The equilibrium ﬂow equations satisfy:
 Unemployment:




g) + (1   s)α(1   ψ)ey
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+ (1   δ)(1   λ)[1   p(θ)]uy = δua + (1   δ)p(θ)ua
25 Matches of unknown quality:
δζ + (1   δ)p(θ)λuy = δeyno + (1   δ)(1   λ)ey
n + (1   δ)[s + (1   s)α]λey
n
(1   δ)p(θ)[(1   λ)uy + ua] + (1   δ)(1   s)(1   α)(1   λ)ey
n
= δea
n + (1   δ)[s + (1   s)α]ea
n
 Matches revealed to be good:
(1   δ)(1   s)αψλey
n = δey
g + (1   δ)(1   λ)ey
g + (1   δ)sλey
g






+ (1   δ)(1   s)(1   λ)ey
g
= δea
g + (1   δ)sea
g
26C Sensitivity analysis
C.1 The labor market entry and exit process
The value of δ was previously ﬁxed to reproduce the share of young workers among the labor
force. However, in the developed framework, I considered a constant labor force so that δ is both
the labor market entry and exit rate. I now propose to compute the model by ﬁxing δ either
to the proportion of new entrants among the labor force (0.21%, French LFS 2002) or to the
proportion of workers exiting the labor market (0.11%, French LFS 2002). Results are provided
in Table 3: According to both simulations, signal extraction problems generate respectively 86%
and 88% of the intergenerational discrepancies in separation rates.
Table 3: Sensitivity tests on δ
Calibration
δ = 0.21% δ = 0.11%
Learning probability 0.1173 0.1076
Match quality signal 0.4 0.348
French Data 2002 Simulation results
Unemployment rate, (%): 7.14 9.10 8.92
[20-24] 15.59 21.35 22.85
[25-49] 6.24 7.55 8.01
Youth relative to Adult 2.5 2.83 2.85
Separation rate, (%): 0.94 0.94 0.94
[20-24] 2.86 2.50 2.78
[25-49] 0.76 0.77 0.84
Youth relative to Adult 3.77 3.24 3.32
Hiring rate, (%): 9.82 9.82 9.82
[20-24] 12.89 9.82 9.82
[25-49] 9.00 9.82 9.82
Youth relative to Adult 1.43 1 1
27C.2 Stochastic age-groups
One can question the age-groups’ choice. To test the robustness of the model, simulations are
done considering the following age-groups: [20-29] and [30-49] years old individuals.
The probability λ is now ﬁxed to so that the average duration of youth is 10 years. The value of
δ is set to 0.37% in order to match a proportion of 20-29 years old individuals among the labor
force of 30.84% (French LFS 2002). The remaining parameters are computed as previously. The
revelation probability of match quality turns out to be α = 0.1329 (average learning process
of 7.5 months) and the proportion of good matches ψ equals 47%. Results are quite similar
to the previous ones (Table 4). The model is now able to match 78.3% of the diﬀerences in
unemployment risks between young and adult workers, and 84.7% of the unemployment gap
between young and adults comes from the time-consuming learning process. As the age-group
of young workers is larger, the observed discrepancies in unemployment and separation rates get
reduced.
Table 4: Simulation results
French Data Simulations Simulations
2002 with ζ = 1
Unemployment rate, (%): 7.14 9.39 8.43
[20-29] 11.71 15.57 12.85
[30-49] 5.65 6.63 6.47
Youth relative to Adult 2.07 2.35 1.99
Separation rate, (%): 0.94 0.94 0.94
[20-29] 1.97 1.63 1.63
[30-49] 0.63 0.66 0.65
Youth relative to Adult 3.14 2.46 2.49
28C.3 The learning process
According to the benchmark calibration, the probability α equals 0.1282 implying an average
learning process of 7.8 months. I provide the simulation results corresponding to the values
α = 0.143 and α = 0.1176, implying respectively an average learning process of 7 and 8.5
months. Table 5 shows that these learning processes generate respectively 86.3% and 82% of the
intergenerational discrepancies in separation rates.
Table 5: Simulation results
French Data Simulations Simulations Simulations
2002 α = 0.1282 α = 0.1429 α = 0.176
(7.8 months) (7 months) (8.5 months)
Unemployment rate, (%): 7.14 9.3 9.32 9.26
[20-24] 15.59 20.14 20.42 19.88
[25-49] 6.24 7.21 7.16 7.21
Youth relative to Adult 2.5 2.79 2.85 2.76
Separation rate, (%): 0.94 0.94 0.945 0.93
[20-24] 2.86 2.27 2.33 2.22
[25-49] 0.76 0.72 0.71 0.72
Youth relative to Adult 3.77 3.16 3.25 3.09
Hiring rate, (%): 9.82 9.82 9.82 9.82
[20-24] 12.89 9.82 9.82 9.82
[25-49] 9.00 9.82 9.82 9.82
Youth relative to Adult 1.43 1 1 1
Finally, I propose to simulate the model for a range of likely α-values. According to Pries
(2004), the learning process on match quality takes in average 7.7 months in the United States.
There are no evidence suggesting that information imperfections are either stronger or weaker
in United States than in Europe. In France, the average trial period of regular contracts is 6
months. Therefore I consider an average learning process taking from 6 to 12 months. Figure
7 represents discrepancies in unemployment and separation rates generated by the framework21
while ﬁgure 8 represents the shape of the separation probability with job tenure22. Simulation
results suggest that the lower the learning probability (the slower the learning process), the lower
21Intergenerational discrepancies are measured by the ratio between the youth and adult unemploy-
ment/separation rates.
22The value of  that yields to empirically plausible tenure proﬁles of job separation rates is the one used in
the benchmark calibration.
29the discrepancies between young and workers over 25 years old. This is due to the decrease in
job separations since less matches are revealed to be bad. For likely values of probability α, the
model generates between 73.8% and 89.6% of the discrepancies observed in unemployment risks:
whatever the time spend to learn about match quality, signal extraction problems seem to be a
major factor of intergenerational discrepancies in labor market outcomes.
Figure 7: Discrepancies in unemployment and separation rates - French data LFS 2002 and
Simulation results according to the learning process



























































French Data, LFS 2002
Figure 8: Separation rates by job tenure - French data LFS 2002 and Simulation results according
to the learning process
































Benchmark Model: learning process of 7.8 months
Model: learning process of 6 months
Model: learning process of 9 months
Model: learning process of 12 months
French Data, LFS 2002
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